Abstract Lawrance (1991) has shown, through the estimation of consumption Euler equations, that subjective rates of impatience (time preference) in the U.S. are three to …ve percentage points higher for households with lower average labor incomes than for those with higher labor income. From a theoretical perspective, the sign of this correlation in a job-search model seems at …rst to be undetermined, since more impatient workers tend to accept wage o¤ers that less impatient workers would not, thereby remaining less time unemployed. The main result of this paper is showing that, regardless of the existence of e¤ects of opposite sign, and independently of the particular speci…cations of the givens of the model, less impatient workers always end up, in the long run, with a higher average income. The result is based on the (unique) invariant Markov distribution of wages associated with the dynamic optimization problem solved by the consumers. An example is provided to illustrate the method.
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wages, over the employment/unemployment cycles, when they are employed, tend to be sometimes lower than the minimum wage acceptable by less impatient workers. However, when both more impatient and less impatient workers face the same circumstances, regarding the job market, the former, for the same reason (having a lower reservation wage), tend to remain less time unemployed.
Since these two facts have opposite e¤ects in the determination of the long-run average wage, the e¤ect of the time preference parameter on this variable is at …rst not clear from a theoretical perspective.
From an empirical perspective, though, Lawrance (1991) estimated consumption Euler equations using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and showed that subjective rates of time preferences can be up to 6 percentage points higher in the top 5 percent of the wage distribution than in the bottom …fth percentile. Two possible explanations of such a pattern have been o¤ered by this author. First, credit constraints (in which case …nancing the smoothing of consumption during a training period would not be feasible, leading more impatient consumers to lower investments in human capital); and, second, the existence of socioeconomic variables which, following this author, would determine at the same time both a higher impatience and a lower level of long-run labor income.
Lawrance's result suggests that models describing the long-run dynamics of the job market should be able to deliver, at least for some speci…cations of the distribution of wage o¤ers and for some values of the parameters, a negative correlation between average labor income and impatience. In this paper I use a modi…ed version of McCall's (1976) classical model of job search to show that, actually, less impatient workers always end up better o¤ in the long-run, regarding the average wage, than more impatient workers. The conclusion does not depend on particular speci…cations of the givens of the model. The two e¤ects of opposite sign to which I have referred before, therefore, happen to have one dominated by the other.
I show these facts by calculating, as a function of the time-preference parameter, the invariant Markovian distribution of the labor income of a given worker (which also coincides with the Markovian distribution of wages in the economy as a whole) and …nding the average wage (of a given worker) under this distribution.
The Model
The givens of the problem, known by all maximizing agents, are a nondegenerated distribution of wage o¤ers, from which workers make indepen-dent draws, a probability of being laid o¤ each period; and a probability, also each period, of not having a (new) wage o¤er.
The basic model presented here, except for the fact that I am considering a probability that the worker does not get a job o¤er next period, is the same as Stokey and Lucas's (1989, c. 10) version of McCall's model. The reader should refer to this source for the demonstrations marked below as standard.
Our group of workers are indexed by [0; 1]: For all purposes, one can think of a small country in which workers receive their job o¤ers from foreign …rms.
Consider the measurable space ( ; F; p) and, in this space, the measure q induced by the wage function w:
In the induced space [0; D]; B [0;D] ; q ; denote by F (t) the distribution function that (q a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure q :
The (representative) worker is not allowed to borrow or to lend. His consumption c t is equal to his income w t in each period. The consumer maximizes the expected present value of consumption E ( P 1 t=0 b t c t ) : By assumption:
State \w" corresponds to a job o¤er w at hand, and state \0" to no job o¤er that period. In state w the worker can accept or turn down the o¤er. If he accepts it, by assumption he is employed with that wage, facing, each period, a probability of unemployment given by ; 0 < 1: If he does not accept the o¤er he will be this period in state 0: Being in state zero the only thing he can do is wait next period for a possible job o¤er (which happens with probability 1 , 0 < 1: The compensation wage he receives when in state zero is considered to be negligible and left out of the model. While employed, the individual is not allowed to search for wage o¤ers.
With v(w) stating for the value function when the state is "wage o¤er w at hand", A for accept and R for reject, the recursive version of the consumer's problem is given by:
where
Proposition 1 There is a unique bounded continuous and weakly increasing function v(.) satisfying (3).
Proof. Standard.
Proposition 2 There is a unique w 2 [0; D] such that:
Proof. Standard.
Proposition 3
In Proposition 2, w (the reservation wage) is determined by:
Proof. From (4) and (5):
Collecting terms:
Use the fact that, from (5), v(0) = w=(1 ) and the de…nition of the variable X to get:
Next, add and subtract R
wdF (w 0 ) to the second member of the equation above and collect terms to get (6).
Proposition 4
The reservation wage is an increasing function of the worker's patience ( ); a decreasing function of the probability of …nding no job o¤ers in the next period ( ) and a decreasing function of the probability of layo¤ :
Proof. The second and third assertions follow immediately from (6).
Regarding the …rst one, de…ne:
and observe that G w = 1 > 0 and G < 0: The result w 0 ( ) > 0 follows (under (1) and (2)) from the implicit function theorem.
A Trivial Case
We have seen above that there are two e¤ects of opposite sign determining the long run average wage. On the one hand, the fact that more patient workers do not accept o¤ers that less patient workers sometimes do. This point acts in favor of the average wage of more patient workers. On the other hand, by not accepting these low o¤ers, more patient workers end up being unemployed at times when less patient workers, with equivalent o¤ers, get the job. This acts against the average wage of more patient workers. Now suppose that the probability of unemployment ( ) is equal to zero (to simplify, assume the same for ; even though it is not necessary for the argument). Then, in the limit, the second e¤ect does not exist anymore and, therefore, it should be trivial proving that more patient workers end up better o¤ in the average. This is done in this section, just for the purpose of enhancing the intuition about the problem.
Since in the next section the general demonstration is carried out with a distribution function that happens to have a density, here I prove the result, for a change (in which turns out to be an analytically less comfortable setting), assuming a discrete distribution. A single application of the law of large numbers su¢ ces (the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem can be used in this case 1 ).
Proposition 5 Consider two economies, 1 and 2, each one operating under the rules of the model presented in section 2, with = = 0: In economy j, j = 1; 2; all workers have a time-preference parameter equal to j ;with Denote the probability masses on these points, respectively, by q 1 ; :::q a 1 1 ; q a 1 ; :::; q ax ; :::q an : Then, the average wage (w A ) of the workers in economy 2 will be no less than the average wage in economy 1 (w A2 w A1 ).
Proof. Make A(j) = [ w(j)
Call w a 1 (1) is the …rst wage no less than the reservation wage of economy 1 ( w(1)); meaning, that a 1 (1) satis…es w a 1 w(1) w a 1 1 : After a certain number of draws the average wage in economy 1 (w A (1)) can be considered to be given by:
Since by assumption 2 > 1 ; and since the reservation wage, by Proposition 2 (with = = 0), is an increasing function of ; we can make w(2) = w(1) + w where w 0: Therefore, in economy 2, either it still happens that w a 1 w(2) = w(1)+ w w a 1 1 ; in which case the average wage in the two economies coincide, or that, for n > x > 1; w ax w(2) w ax 1 w a 1 and w A (2) = P an i=ax w i q i P an i=ax q i In this second case, the average wage in economy 2 is no less than the average wage in economy 1 due to the general fact that, given (8), for any x > 1 :
i=ax w i q i P an i=ax q i This is equivalent to having:
which is true by (8).
Although illustrative, this example is a simple consequence of the fact that w(2) w(1). This implies that after the draws have been taken by all workers in each economy one is actually averaging two groups of numbers, the …rst of which has a lower bound no greater than the second. This trivially implies w A (2) w A (1):
The General Case
The transition dynamics in this section draws upon a similar problem analyzed by Stokey In order to talk about an invariant distribution of wages in this economy, it is necessary to show that the distribution of wage o¤ers has one and only one …xed point under the operator T : For the demonstration of this important point it su¢ ces, by the contraction theorem, proving that, for some Proving that T N is a contraction, therefore, is the only thing we have to do here. This can be easily done with the help of Lemma 11.11 and exercise 11.5a in Stokey and Lucas (1989) . Following these results, for T Proof. Take N = 2 and w 0 = 0: From what we saw about the transition function P , there are two cases to consider: if
Then, > 0 and P N (w; fw 0 g) = P 2 (w; f0g) > ; all w 2 [0; D]: This proves that T N is a contraction. The result then follows from the N-stage contraction theorem. The second assertion follows by de…nition.
The next step is deriving the limiting measure of the state of the economy, particularly for sets C A (of employed workers).
A worker, in period t + 1; is employed with wage w 2 C; if and only if he was unemployed and got a wage o¤er w 2 C or he was already employed with wage w in the beginning of period t + 1 and kept his job. Given the assumed independence of job o¤ers in each period, we can write
The determination of the long-run measure (C) = lim t!1 t (C) requires the calculation of t (A c ): Since a worker is unemployed in period t + 1 i¤ he was already unemployed and drew a wage o¤er in A c or was employed and lost his job, we have:
Taking limits, equation (11a) trivially implies (A c ) = = [ + q(A)(1 )] : Taking limits in (10) and using this result yields, for C A :
We are now ready to calculate the average wage in each cohort j of the economy. This is given by:
where w( ) follows (6). Consistently with the observation we have made before, that there are two e¤ects of opposite sign determining the e¤ect on w A ; when is allowed to change, it is not clear from (12), at …rst glance, if the average wage is an increasing function of the time-preference parameter or not. Indeed, as increases, so does the reservation wage, leading to a fall of q(A): At the same time, though, the region of integration in (12) increases.
Proposition 7 below delivers the main result of this paper, for the case in which F (w) is absolutely continuous. Proposition 7 Under Remark 1, the average wage is an increasing function of the time preference parameter :
Proof. Using the distribution function F and its respective density function (f (w)) with respect to the Lebesgue measure in R; it follows from the result above that the average wage is now given by:
wf (w)dw
In the following I omit the argument in the functions. Taking the derivative in (13) with respect to w :
The expresson of the reservation wage given by (6) allows us to write:
By the chain rule, w
The result follows from (14) and Propositon 2.
Example 1 Consider an economy in which, each period, workers face a probability of layo¤ and a probability of having no wage o¤er next period. Suppose that q is the Lebesgue measure in [0; 1]: Using (6):
By (12), the average wage reads:
To obtain the sign of w 0 ( ) in (15) make z( ) = 1 ( ) (1 ) ; and note that w(z( )) = h(z) = z p z 2 1: Use the chain rule and the fact that h 0 (z) < 0 for z > 1 (as it happens to be the case) and z 0 ( ) < 0 to get w 0 ( ) > 0: Use the chain rule again to conclude that to show that w Taking the derivative in (16) with respect to w leads to:
has only one root between zero and one, which is given by:
Since g 00 ( w) = 2 > 0; all we have to prove is that w( ) < w 1 (this implies g( w( )) > 0): This can be done with the help of the function h(z) de…ned above.
Since h 0 (z) < 0; if we can show that
(meaning, the z in the determination of w( ) is greater than the z in the determination of w 1 ) then w( ) < w 1 :But
> 0: The reservation wage and the long-run average wage for this example are illustrated in Figure 1 , below, …rst as a function of beta and teta, with = 0, and then as a function of beta and alpha, with = 0.
As one can observe from the …gure, if theta is very close to zero, the reservation wage tends to one when tends to one. Intuitively, the worker with beta close to one will reject a very big percentage of all o¤ers, remaining with a wage equal to zero, whereas the worker with lower beta might accept and go on keeping his average away from zero. With theta very close to zero, though, once the patient worker accepts an o¤er, he remains employed with that wage for a very very long period of time, eventually catching up with the less patitent worker and ending up, in the long-run, with a higher average.
Note, also, that the tendency of the reservation wage to get close to one is reverted when theta increases, but not when alpha increases. When either alpha or theta increase, both the reservation wage and the average wage decrease. The e¤ect of theta over the reservation wage and over the average wage, though, is much more noticiable than the e¤ect of alpha.
Conclusions
The empirical evidence provided by Lawrance (1991) has shown that subjective rates of time preferences can be up to 6 percent higher in the top 5 percent of the income distribution than in the bottom …fth percentile. Given any exogenous distribution of wages, as well as time preferences, probability of unemployment and probability of not …nding a job o¤er next period, I have shown that Lawrance's result can be theoretically supported by the well known mechanism of an intertemporal job-seach model, even though the result is not clear at …rst glance, due to the existence of two e¤ects pointing out in opposite directions. An example was provided to illustrate the method.
